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DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS DUTY TO
WARN IN THE CONTEXT OF AIDS PATIENTS AND
THEIR PARTNERS
Imagine the following situation:
You are a general practitioner in a relatively large metropolitan
city. You have been Bob's personal physician for years. During his
recent annual physical examination, Bob asked that you test him for
Acquired Immune Deficiency Symdrome (AIDS). Both the ELISA'
and Western Blot2 tests returned positive for the AIDS antibody.
Although you have specifically advised him to do so, Bob has re-
fused to discuss the test results with anyone-including his fiancee,
his ex-wife, and any of his past sexual partners. You know his ex-
wife personally as she is also one of your patients. You have not,
however, met Bob's fiancee and have no information concerning his
past sexual partners. Bob has prohibited you from discussing his
condition with anyone.
This simple factual scenario presents a multitude of ethical,
medical, and legal dilemmas. As the doctor, you find yourself in a
precarious position, forced to choose between conflicting yet com-
pelling courses of conduct. If you choose to tell Bob's contacts,-you
necessarily breach the traditional doctor-patient confidentiality,
mandated by both the medical profession and the law.' If you re-
1. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26.
2. See infra text accompanying note 27.
3. The Hippocratic Oath states in relevant part: "Whatsoever things I see or hear
concerning the life of man, in attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom which
ought not to be noised about, I will keep silent thereon, counting such things to be
personal secrets." As quoted in J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 234
(1971). For a more modem, yet limited, interpretation, see also AM. MEDICAL ASS'N,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS.
The State of Maryland has enacted a specific statute that deals with confidentiality
and medical records. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (Supp. 1987) states:
(a) Authorized disctosures.-Any provider of medical care who has custody
of medical records may reveal specific medical information contained in those
records:
(1) To the individual on whom the records is kept or the individual's
agent or representative; or
(2) As authorized in Article 48A, Subtitle 20 of the Code.
(b) Prohibited disclosures.-Any provider of medical care who has custody of
medical records may not reveal specific medical information contained in those
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spect the confidence, you may knowingly subject others to a foresee-
able danger which ultimately may result in death.4 Which path
should you choose, and what will be the legal ramifications of your
decision? Should the fact that the medical condition involved is
AIDS play any special role in the decision? Does current Maryland
records to any person unless authorized by the individual on whom the record
is kept.
(c) Inapplicability of section.-Subsection (b) of this section does not apply
to a provider of medical care who has custody of medical records if the provider
is:
(1) Performing medical services or allied support services for or on
behalf of a patient;
(2) Providing information requested by or to further the purpose of
a medical review committee, accreditation board, or commission, or in re-
sponse to legal process;
(3) -Providing information required to conduct the proper activities
of the health care provider;
(4) Providing information to a government agency performing its
lawful duties as authorized by an act of the Maryland General Assembly or the
United States Congress;
(5) Providing information at the request of a researcher for medical
and health care research under a protocol approved by an institutional review
board;
(6) Revealing the contents of medical records under circumstances
where the identity of the patient is not disclosed to the recipient of the records;
(7) Providing information to an insurance company or to a defend-
ant or the defendant's legal counsel, in connection with a potential or actual
malpractice claim against a provider of medical care;
(8) Providing information requested by another provider of medical
care for the sole purpose of treating the individual on whom the record is kept;
(9) Providing information to a third party payor for billing purposes
only;
(10) Providing information to a nonprofit health service plan or a
Blue Cross or Blue Shield Plan to coordinate benefit payments under more
than one sickness and accident, dental, or hospital and medical insurance policy
other than an individual policy; or
(I1) Providing information to organ and tissue procurement per-
sonnel under the restrictions of § 5-408 of this article at the request of a physi-
cian for a patient whose organs and tissues may be donated for the purpose of
evaluating the patient for possible organ and tissue donation.
(d) Penaly.-A provider of medical care who knowingly violates any pro-
vision of this section shall be liable to a plaintiff for any damages recoverable in
law or equity, including reasonable attorney's fees.
4. Doctors "may be sued by patients for wrongful disclosure and personal suffering
that might result from ... disclosure if they breach confidentiality; they may also be sued
by their patient's sexual partners if they knowingly fail to protect them from preventable
harm or risk of infection from their patient's illness." Winston, AIDS anda Duty to Protect,
17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (1987). See also Lewis, Duty to Warn Versus Duty to Maintain
Confidentiality: Conflicting Demands on Mental Health Professionals, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 579,
595 (1986) ("Courts have entertained suits for wrongful disclosure upon theories of
invasion of privacy, express or implied statutory violations, breach of implied contract,
and tortious violation of a duty to maintain confidentiality.").
676
AIDS-CONFIDENTIALITY VS. DUTY To WARN
law provide adequate guidance for doctors facing this very difficult
situation?
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
AIDS is both a frightening and a mysterious disease. Although
progress has been made in researching its origins and effects, the
alarming truth remains that once AIDS is contracted the result is
invariably the same--death. There is no cure.5 In fact, the lapse of
time between diagnosis and death ii approximately one and one-
half years.6 To date, 62,200 cases of AIDS have been reported in
the United States. In addition, experts predict that at least that
many people suffer from AIDS-Related Complex (ARC). As of May
16, 1988, there had been 59,051 reported deaths resulting from
AIDS.8
Although much is currently unknown about this fatal disease,
the medical profession has made some limited determinations.
AIDS "is a virus-caused condition which compromises the natural
disease-resisting systems of its victims, thus rendering them ex-
tremely susceptible to infections."9 It "is a profound irreversible
immune dysfunction that is caused when the HIV [human immu-
nodeficiency virus] infects the T4 lymphocytes, or special white
blood cells .... As the body's immune system is impaired, opportu-
nistic infections and/or rare malignancies continue to weaken the
body until death occurs."' °
Scientists further have determined that although deadly, the vi-
rus is not hardy. It is killed easily and cannot live outside the body
for long periods of time.'. In addition the HIV infection is difficult
to contract and cannot be transmitted by casual contact.12 The virus
is transmitted through intimate sexual contact, parenteral exposure
5. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, AIDS AND MARYLAND 4 (1986). See also Curran, Clark
& Gostin, AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of Traditional Disease Control
Measures, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27 (1987).
6. Address by Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Chairman of Governor's Task Force on AIDS,
Law & Medicine Class, University of Maryland School of Law (Oct. 28, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Brandt Address].
7. Telephone inquiry to Surveillance & Evaluation Branch, United States AIDS Pro-
gram, Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control (May 18. 1988) (Tel.
no. (404) 639-3534) [hereinafter CDC Telephone Inquiry].
8. Id.
9. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AIDS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES 2
(Sept. 8, 1987).
10. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5. at 4.
I1. Brandt Address, supra note 6.
12. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 2.
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to infected blood or blood products, or perinatally from mother to
fetus.' 3 More specifically, with regard to sexual intercourse,
"[alithough the AIDS virus is found in several body fluids, a person
acquires the virus during sexual contact with an infected person's
blood or semen and possibly vaginal secretions."' 4
Small ... tears in the surface lining of the vagina or rectum
may occur during insertion of the penis, fingers, or other
objects, thus opening an avenue for entrance of the virus
directly into the blood stream; therefore, the AIDS virus
can be passed from penis to rectum and vagina and vice
versa without a visible tear in the tissue or the presence of
blood. I
The majority of AIDS cases involve homosexual males. Of the
62,200 AIDS cases reported as of May 16, 1988, 38,736 were homo-
sexual or bisexual males; 4539 of those also had a history of intrave-
nous drug abuse.' 6 While those most at risk are homosexuals and
intravenous drug users, cases among heterosexuals are increasing.
Heterosexuals who abuse intravenous drugs are obviously at greater
risk than those who do not. 17 This is not to say, however, that heter-
osexuals, even those who do not engage in illicit use of intravenous
drugs, are free from danger.
The problem of AIDS in women presents special concerns.
AIDS is spreading, and although "AIDS and HIV infection currently'
remain a predominantly male disease, the number of HIV infected
women continues to grow .... [A]s [the] absolute number of wo-
men with HIV infection increases, so do the chances for producing
HIV infected babies through the perinatal transmission of the vi-
rus. , ' 8 In addition, "it may be difficult for women to identify them-
selves as being at risk for HIV infection because they may be
unaware of the sexual or drug using behaviors of their past or pres-
ent partners. As a result, women may be less likely to take knowing
13. Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACTS ABOUT AIDS 1 (Aug.
1985) [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT AIDS].
14. U.S. DEP'T F HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON Ac-
QUIRED IMMUNE DEIICIENCY SYNDROME 16 (1987).
15. Id.
16. CDC Telep'.one Inquiry, supra note 7.
17. As of May 06, 1988, there was a total of 11,357 reported AIDS cases among
intravenous drug users, of whom 8847 were male and 2511 were female. Of the male
total, 4539 were homosexual or bisexual. Id.
18. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE. supra note 5. at 10.
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precautions to protect themselves."' 9 Simply put, "[t]he greater the
number of sexual partners, the greater the risk. The chances of in-
fection from one encounter are between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 10."' °
Others say the risk of infection from a single sexual contact is ap-
proximately 1 in 300.21 Of those infected, presumably not everyone
will develop AIDS. In 1986 experts estimated that ten to forty per-
cent of HIV-infected persons would progress to AIDS within five
years of being infected.22 Those same experts now fear that the rate
is closer to 100 percent.?.
It is important to note that existing "tests merely record the
presence of antibodies to the HIV-the test does not confirm the
presence of the virus itself."24 The two available tests are the
ELISA and the Western Blot. The ELISA is basically a screening
test. Its primary purpose is to detect negative results. A major
drawback of the test is that it "is known to produce a high level of
false positive results, which increases if the test is performed on
non-high risk groups. 2 5 Indications are that the ELISA test pro-
duces twenty to thirty percent false positives.26 The more expensive
Western Blot is a confirmatory test. It has an extremely low error
rate, estimated to be approximately 0.5 percent. The accepted med-
ical procedure is to first administer an ELISA. Should the test be
positive, a second ELISA is performed. It is only if these first two
tests are positive that a Western Blot is administered.2 7 Even if a
patient tests positive for the AIDS antibody, it is possible, although
unlikely, that he or she may never actually develop the disease.2"
Seropositive individuals, however, are presumed capable of trans-
mitting the infection to others.29
Returning to the hypothetical situation proposed earlier, Bob
therefore must be considered capable of transmitting the AIDS vi-
19. Id. Women now account for approximately 8% of all reported AIDS cases. The
national average iA expected to reach 117 in the near future. Id. at 9-10.
20. McAuliffe, AIDS: At the Dawn of Fear, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT 60, 66 (an.
12, 1987).
21. Brandt Address, supra note 6.
22. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 2.
23. Brandt Address, supra note 6.
24. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 20. See also Aaronson, The Medical-Legal
Faces of AIDS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREVENTION 40, (Sept./Oct. 1987).
25. Hermann, Liability Related to Diagnosis and Transmission of liDS, 15 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 36, 37 (1987).
26. Brandt Address. supra note 6.
27. Id.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
29. Curran, Clark & Gostin, supra note 5, at 27, 29.
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rus. Even though he may not show signs of suffering from the dis-
ease, anyone who has had intimate sexual contact with him since his
infection is at risk. The extent of the risk is, at this time, only specu-
lative, but as previously mentioned, it may-range anywhere from 1 in
10 to 1 in 1000.30 Does the doctor have a duty to warn those at risk?
If so, who should be warned? When should they be warned? What
shquld they be told?
II. , LEGAL DUTY TO WARN
An individual has no common-law duty to warn innocent others
of the existence of danger unless that individual is responsible for
the creation of the danger. As was made abundantly clear by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Pope v. State,3" "[u]nder the present
state of our law, a person has no legal obligation to care for or look
after the welfare of a stranger, adult or child."3 2 The court went on
to explain that: "'Generally, one has no legal duty to aid another in
peril, even when that aid can be rendered without danger or incon-
venience to himself ... A moral duty to take affirmative action is
not enough to enforce a legal duty to do so." s Suffice it to say that
ordinarily "a person may stand by with impunity and watch another
being murdered, raped, robbed, assaulted or otherwise unlawfully
harmed."34
There are, however, exceptions to the common-law rule that no
duty exists. "[Wihen the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a
defendant to control the conduct of another person, or to warn of
such conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed liability...
if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous
person or to the potential victim.""5 In Lamb v. HopkinsM6 the State
of Maryland expressly adopted the special relationship exception set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315."T
In the hypothetical situation presented, Bob's fiancee, ex-wife
30. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
31. 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (third party stood by while three-month-old
infant was fatally beaten by his mother).
32. Id. at 324, 396 A.2d at 1064.
33. Id. (quoting W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 183 (1972)).
34. Id.
35. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 342-
43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-23 (1976).
36. 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985).
37. Section 315 carves out a limited exception to § 314's mandate that the "fact that
the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid
or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). Section 315 states:
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and other sexual partners are all presumably at risk. The question
remains whether the section 315 exception, adopted in Lamb, ap-
plies to Bob's situation. In order to invoke the exception a special
relationship must exist either (1) between the doctor and Bob which
imposes a duty upon the doctor to control Bob's conduct, or (2) be-
tween the doctor and potential victim which gives the victim a right
to protection. It seems clear that no special relationship exists be-
tween the doctor and either Bob's fiancee or past sexual partners.
Bob's ex-wife, however, is a patient of the doctor, entitled to the
same degree of care, counsel, and protection as Bob himself. She
may well fall within the narrow confines of the exception.
Bob's own relationship with the doctor may be sufficient, on the
other hand, to invoke the exception. Although Maryland has not
spoken on the issue, some jurisdictions have held that the relation-
ship between doctor and; patient is sufficient to support the doctor's
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others against the dan-
gers of the patient's illness.38 The question is one of degree: Is
their relationship such that it imposes a duty upon the doctor to
control Bob's conduct? Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
attempts to answer this question.
Section 319 imposes a duty on those in charge of people having
dangerous propensities. It specifically provides that: "one who
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent
him from doing such harm." 9 The operative words contained ,in
this section, "takes charge" and "control," are obviously vague.
The Restatement has made no formal attempt to define them. Mary-
land has adopted a rather strict interpretation of the provision. In
Lamb the court interpreted section 319 to mean that one typically
takes charge of a third person by placing the individual in custody.40
By way of illustration, the court went on to provide examples of situ-
ations in which "control" would exist. These included "a correc-
tional institution incarcerating a dangerous criminal, or a mental
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives
to the other a right of protection.
38. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
40. Lamb, 303 Md. at 246, 492 A.2d at 1302.
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institution confining a dangerous patient."' 4' Although the exam-
ples were not in themselves exhaustive, they do suggest that at a
minimum some curtailment of the third person's liberty is a prereq-
uisite to a finding of sufficient "control."
If this strict construction of the Restatement is followed (no Mary-
land court has yet addressed the precise situation presented here), it
seems assured that Bob's relationship with the doctor would not
constitute "taking charge" or "control." This would change dramat-
ically, however, should Bob's doctor in any way confine or restrict
his freedom. The question then arises whether in-patient versus
out-patient status is really a valid distinction at all.42
Even if the Restatement's "special relationship" exception is in-
applicable in the present situation, the doctor still may have a duty
to warn those at risk. Yet another exception to the general rule of
no duty is one involving contagious diseases. The fact that Bob is
infected with the AIDS virus may be a significant factor in determin-
ing whether the hypothetical situation falls within this particular
exception.
"The trend in case law has been to place a duty on the doctors
of patients with communicable diseases to warn the patients or their
families that those in contact with such patients may contract the
disease.""'s This exception is a logical, concrete extension of the be-
lief that members of the medical profession owe a duty not only to
their patients, but to all of society as well. Physicians have a respon-
sibility to prevent the spread of contagious diseases by detecting
and isolating them before large numbers of people become in-
fected.44 It is for this reason that "the courts hold that a doctor is
liable to persons infected by his patient if he negligently fails to di-
agnose a contagious disease .... or, having diagnosed the illness,
fails to warn members of the patient's family."" 5 It generally is rec-
ognized that once a physician diagnoses a contagious disease it is
the physician's duty to use reasonable care to advise members of the
patient's immediate family of the existence of the disease and to
41. Id. (citations omitted).
42. It is unclear how much "control" is required before § 319 will apply. Would
nursing homes, halfway houses, and detention centers fall within the control section?
Perhaps a distinction should be made between medical doctors and psychotherapists as
"control" of the mind may continue after physical "control" has ceased.
43. Hermann, supra note 25, at 38.
44. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association 2
(Nov. 1987) [hereinafter Council Report].
45. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436-37, 551 P.2d 334,
344, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24 (1976).
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warn them of its dangers.46
In Wojcik v. Aluminum Company of America 47 an employee brought
suit against his employer for failing to disclose to him x-ray results
showing that the plaintiff was developing tuberculosis. Wojcik's wife
also filed suit alleging
that due to defendant's negligence, she came in close con-
tact with her husband and lived with him in the same home
as man and wife; that if defendant had advised her regard-
ing her husband's true physical condition, the same would
have been attended to and treated and immediate and
proper steps would have been taken to avoid her con-
tracting the disease; that early and prompt medical atten-
tion would have been received by her and that by reason of
defendant's negligence she sustained serious, painful and
probably permanent injuries ... 48
The court found.that the risk of Mrs. Wojcik "contracting tuberculo-
sis from her husband, when unaware that he was so afflicted, was
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant."49 Furthermore, the court
went on to say that:
It is the duty of a physician who is attending a patient af-
flicted with a contagious or infectious disease to exercise
care in advising and warning members of the family and
others who are liable to exposure of the existence and 'na-
ture of the danger from the disease, to avoid doing any act
which would tend to spread the infection, and to take all
necessary precautionary measures to prevent its spread to
other patients attended. A physician who fails to give such
warning is negligent, and is liable in damages to any person
injured as the direct and proximate result of his
negligence.5 °
Is this, then, the end of the inquiry? Since AIDS is a contagious
disease, does the doctor have a duty to inform all those at risk of
contracting it?
46. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
47. 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959).
48. Id. at 745, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
49. Id. at 746, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 357-58.
50. Id. at 746-47, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 358 (quoting 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 48
(1987). See also Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 391-92, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (1921)
("[A]n attending physician is, in a certain sense, in custody of a patient afflicted with
infectious or contagious disease. And he owes a duty to those who ... are liable to be
brought in contact with the patient, to instruct and advise them as to the character of the
disease.").
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AIDS is a disease like no other; it would be a mistake to include
AIDS in the same category as other contagious diseases like small-
pox, tuberculosis, typhoid, and scarlet fever. It is critically impor-
tant to recognize that AIDS, unlike these other diseases, is not
casually transmitted. Unlike typhoid and scarlet fever, AIDS does
not pose a threat to everyone in close proximity to an infected per-
son. Experts surmise that AIDS is difficult to contract.5 ' Working
with, speaking with, or even touching an AIDS victim does not place
a person at risk. Studies have shown that those who live with AIDS-
infected individuals do not become infected themselves. This fact
alone requires that AIDS be considered separately from other com-
municable diseases.
Efforts to group AIDS with sexually transmitted diseases also
must be avoided. Most venereal diseases are curable; AIDS is not.
The common law may impose upon physicians the duty to inform an
identifiable third party of an infectious disease.52 Such a duty, how-
ever, should not be imposed in the case of AIDS for two reasons.
First, to distinguish it from scarlet fever and similar diseases, AIDS
is not-cannot be-transmitted through casual contact. Second,
AIDS cannot be equated with other sexually transmitted diseases
because, at least at present, there is no cure.53 In effect, doctors
would be telling people who already have been exposed to the virus
that they have been so exposed, but that if they do succumb to the
disease, no cure is available.
Although not specifically accepted or rejected in Maryland,
there is conceivably one more argument to be made for advocating
that the hypothetical doctor has a duty to warn Bob's contacts. This
duty was first enunciated in the landmark case of Tarasoffv. Regents of
the University of California.H In that case, Prosenjit Poddar killed Ta-
tiana Tarasoff. The decedent's parents filed suit against Poddar's
51. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
53. The Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) provides for contact tracing when
certain sexually transmitted diseases are reported. When a case of syphilis is reported,
"[aill persons identified as having had potentially infective contact with a patient ...
receive medical and laboratory examination[s] and . . . receive medical treatment for
syphilis on an epidemiologic basis." MD. REcs. CODE tit. X, § 10.06.01.18 (1983). If
other venereal diseases are reported it is "the duty of the physician ... to interview the
patient immediately in order to ascertain the names, descriptions, and addresses of all
persons with whom the patient has had potentially infective contact." Id. § 10.06.01.22.
These names are then forwarded to a state health officer so that the at-risk individuals
can be contacted. This procedure is not followed with cases of AIDS, presumably be-
cause it would discourage people from beingtested.
54. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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therapist, claiming that Poddar had informed the therapist of his in-
tent to kill an unnamed, readily identifiable woman. They claimed
that the therapist had a duty to warn the intended victim or her fam-
ily. Agreeing with the plaintiffs, the court held that "once a thera-
pist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional
standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a
serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger."5 5
The court did not specifically mandate that warnings be given.
Rather, it recognized that discharge of the duty
may require the therapist to take one or more of various
steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus, it may
call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to
apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or
take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under
the circumstances.56
The court went on to say that the duty to do something arises
upon balance of a number of considerations. These factors include:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff (here, Bob's contacts);
(2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's (doctor's) con-
duct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm;
(6) the extent of the burden on the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for any breach; and (7) the availability of insurance.5 7 Ap-
plying the above criteria to the Tarasoff facts, the court found that
the therapist indeed might owe a duty to foreseeable victims. 5,
As previously mentioned, Maryland has neither accepted nor
rejected the Tarasoff holding. Although it may choose to do so in
the future, the court as yet has not been forced to make a decision.5 9
55. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
56. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
57. Id. at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
58. A later California decision interpreted the Tarasoff duty to warn to require a
"known, identifiable victim." Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 758,
614 P.2d 728, 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 80 (1980).
59. Two Maryland cases, although factually dissimilar to Tarasoff, have cited the case.
In Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980), the wife's lover was shot by
her husband when he found them in bed together. The injured lover then brought suit
against the husband's psychiatric team claiming that they had failed to warm him of the
husband's unstable and violent condition. The court found no merit to the claim as
"there was no threat revealed to the 'team' by (the husband] to kill or injure Dr. Shaw."
Id. at 725, 415 A.2d at 630. Since Shaw was not a foreseeable victim, there was no duty
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: Initially, the question arises whether Tarasoff, which pertains to
psychotherapists, can be extended to medical doctors as well.6'
Once this threshold is reached, the factors delineated in Tarasoff
must be considered. Again, it is instructive to refer to the hypotheti-
cal situation presented earlier. It is entirely foreseeable that Bob's
contacts will be endangered if the doctor chooses not to warn them
of Bob's illness. The question is really one of practicality, iden-
tifiability, and reasonableness. The doctor knows Bob's ex-wife per-
sonally. In fact, as already discussed, her section 315 "special
relationship" with the doctor probably entitles her to be warned.
Bob's fiancee, although not personally known to the doctor, cer-
tainly falls within the ambit of Tarasoff foreseeability. She can be
readily identified. She actually may present the strongest argument
in favor of disclosure because she is the person most likely to have
sexual contact with Bob in the future, and she may not yet have been
infected with the virus. She is, therefore, one person who may still
be saved. Presumably, the other contacts are no longer engaging in
sexual intercourse with Bob; if they were going to get the disease
from Bob, they already have contracted it. Warning them at this
time may benefit the contacts' future sexual partners, and may influ-
ence their decisions regarding pregnancy, but it will do nothing to
prevent these immediate contacts from developing AIDS as a result
of their relations with Bob. It is clear that if the doctor fails to warn
Bob's contacts, each could suffer some degree of harm.6 '
If any of these contacts develop AIDS, it will be certain that
each has suffered some kind of injury. More difficult to determine,
however, is the closeness of the connection between the doctor's
failure to warn and the ultimate injury suffered by the AIDS vic-
tims.62 This is equally true of all of Bob's contacts. Matters of prox-
imate cause and proof become especially problematic. There is
really no accurate method of determining from whom the infection
to warn him. In Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 454 A.2d 414
(1983), the parents of a young boy who was brutally murdered by a patient who left the
hospital brought suit against, inter alia, the hospital. The court found that the defend-
ants did not owe a duty to the young boy, stating that before a duty can exist "the victim
must be readily identifiable." Id. at 489, 454 A.2d at 421.
60. The "degree of dependence and trust patients place on their therapist often ex-
ceeds the levels of reliance they ordinarily place on medical doctors." Lewis, supra note
4, at 595.
61. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. In addition, these contacts, una-
ware of their at-risk status, may infect others or pass the disease along to their children.
62. See Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921) (demonstrating
problems of proximate cause in suit against doctor for failing to warn family members of
patient's typhoid condition).
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is contracted. There is almost no way to prove that Bob's contacts
contracted the virus from him. This is a particularly troublesome
dilemma as it requires probing investigations into individuals' pri-
vate lives. Perhaps Bob's ex-wife was not faithful during the mar-
riage. Perhaps she had numerous encounters with intravenous drug
users before their marriage. Maybe her present boyfriend is bisex-
ual. The same may be true of Bob's other sexual partners. The
long incubation period associated with AIDS63 only serves to make
the causation problem more difficult.
The fourth Tarasoff factor to be evaluated is the moral blame
attached to the doctor's conduct-more specifically, the doctor's de-
liberate decision not to warn Bob's contacts. This is a difficult factor
to assess. At first glance, a conscious decision not to warn of poten-
tial death strikes one as morally indefensible. On the other hand, it
is really the AIDS carrier who has behaved intolerably. It is the pa-
tient, by refusing to disclose his or her medical condition to sexual
partners, who creates this situation. The patient forces the doctor
into the position of either breaking a confidence or failing to warn.
Although jurors might not readily agree with a doctor's decision to
remain silent, they probably would not condemn such conduct
either.
Another factor of particular interest in the context of AIDS is
the extent of the burden on the doctor and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liabil-
ity for breach. If the doctor is required to warn potential third-party
victims of an AIDS patient's condition, many experts are convinced
that fewer people will come in for testing and treatment." If true,
this could have disastrous effects on efforts to research, understand,
control, and cure AIDS. It is absolutely essential that statistics on
AIDS be accurate and continually updated. The more that scientists
know about the circumstances surrounding the disease, the better
their chances of eventually developing a cure. In the long run, it
would be more beneficial to society as a whole to minimize the de-
terrents to being tested. Furthermore, requiring doctors to warn
potential victims would place a heavy burden on the doctors' shoul-
ders. Would the hypothetical doctor have to investigate Bob's per-
sonal life? Would the doctor be required to track down all of the
sexual partners that Bob has had during his lifetime? And what
63. Medical experts approximate the incubation period to be anywhere between six
months and five years or more. FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 13, at 2.
64. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 24. See also The Sun (Baltimore). July
1, 1988, at AI, col. 2.
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would the doctor tell them, assuming, of course, that they could
even be located?" Is it reasonable, practical, or efficient to require
this of doctors?
The final two factors include the availability of insurance and
the public policy of preventing future harm; only the latter merits
discussion here.65 On the one hand, requiring a warning actually
might cause future harm. If at-risk individuals, concerned about
confidentiality, avoid testing, then more people eventually could be
subjected to the virus. On the other hand, warnings might influence
the behavior of those warned, thereby potentially protecting their
future sexual contacts, their future children, and society in general.
Even if Maryland were to adopt the Tarasoffrule and extend the
delineated duty to medical doctors, it is difficult to say whether the
proposed hypothetical AIDS scenario would require the doctor to
warn potential victims. Does an AIDS patient pose "a serious dan-
ger of violence to others"? The answer is not as readily apparent as
one might think. The threat is real and the result is death, but what
are the actual chances of that happening? And how much of a
chance is sufficient to constitute a "serious danger"? Initially it was
thought that sexual partners of HIV-positive individuals had a 1 in
1000 chance of contracting the virus with each sexual encounter.
Even if someone did contract the virus there was still only a ten to
forty percent chance of developing AIDS.6 6 These statistics are con-
stantly changing. No one is really sure of the risks. Recent specula-
tion includes a I in 300 chance of contracting the virus and a 100
percent chance of ultimately succumbing to AIDS. These statistics
are critically important to the issue at hand. The greater the risk,
the more convincing the argument for warnings. Also of import are
the individual's sexual practices. If a condom always is used, the risk
is reduced dramatically. The frequency with which the individual
has sexual intercourse is also a relevant factor. Clearly the risks fluc-
tuate with each individual case.
It is for these reasons that even if Maryland were to adopt a
duty to warn, implementation would have to be on a case-by-case
basis. At the very least, the potential victim would have to be readily
identifiable.67 And as previously mentioned, 6 8 it would be ex-
tremely difficult to establish proximate cause. It is important to re-
65. Although the availability of insurance is of critical importance to AIDS victims, it
is not particularly relevant here given the narrow focus of this Comment.
66. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 59.
68. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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member that the adequacy of the doctor's conduct "must be
measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendi-
tion of reasonable care under the circumstances.1 69 It is well-set-
tled law that
[t]hree basic elements are necessary to state a cause of ac-
tion in negligence. First, the defendant must be under a
duty to protect the plaintiff from injury. Second, the de-
fendant must fail to discharge that duty. Third, the plaintiff
must suffer actual loss or injury proximately resulting from
that failure. °
Even if Maryland specifically adopts Tarasoff, and even if the doctor
fails to warn a foreseeable victim, it still is doubtful that the physi-
cian actually would be held liable for the breach.7 '
III. DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
In the Tarasoff decision the court briefly addressed the issue of
doctor-patient confidentiality. Defense counsel raised the argument
that "the giving of a warning ... constitutes a breach of trust which
entails the revelation of confidential communications. "72 The court
elected a balancing approach, stating that in limited situations pub-
lic policy demands that the confidence be breached. The court
noted that "the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he
not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert
danger to others." ' This is in harmony with the medical profes-
sion's own ethics which, as set forth in the Principles of Medical Ethics
of the American Medical Association, provide in relevant part that
"[a] physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the
course of medical attendance ... unless he is required to do so by
law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of
the individual or the community."174
To a certain extent, it seems logical that a patient may expect
confidentiality, but it is equally logical that this confidentiality have
69. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439, 551 P.2d 334, 345,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976) (citation omitted).
70. Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 241, 492 A.2d 1297, 1300 (1985) (citations
omitted).
7 1. Even the doctor who ultimately prevails in court will have been forced to litigate
the issue, with possible damage to reputation and an increase in insurance premiums.
The fact that the doctor ultimately may prevail is not a viable solution to the problem at
hand.
72. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
73. Id. at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (citation omitted).
74. AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, supra note 3.
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limits. "It is not reasonable for a patient to expect a [doctor] to
allow him to inflict serious harm on another person." 75 The Tarasoff
court concluded "that the public policy favoring protection of the
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications
must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert dan-
ger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril
begins." 76
Yet it must be noted that AIDS is a unique disease, perhaps
demanding special consideration. The terrible social stigma associ-
ated with this deadly disease cannot be overlooked or overesti-
mated. Fear of AIDS, coupled with and resulting from the current
paucity of concrete information about the disease, has fueled a fire
of panic. There are numerous reports of infected individuals losing
their homes, jobs, friends, and insurance. benefits.77 The effects on
the patient from a breach of confidentiality simply cannot be
ignored.
Society also may suffer from such a breach. The public's confi-
dence in the confidentiality of test results is of critical importance in
encouraging individuals to be tested. Another relevant considera-
tion is the fact that, as yet, there is no cure for AIDS. Little can be
done for those afflicted. Since "[h]aving AIDS or HIV infection, or
knowing that one has been exposed directly to the virus, can have
severe psychological, social and economic consequences for an indi-
vidual and his or her family, ' "7 it may not be beneficial to breach a
confidence and tell someone who would rather not know.
The State of Maryland delilberately chose not only to advocate
but also to strengthen the medical profession's traditional policy re-
garding the importance of maintaining doctor-patient confidential-
ity. 79 Section 4-301 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code is entitled "Disclosure of Medical Records" and
provides for both authorized and prohibited disclosures of informa-
tion.8 ° By enacting section 4-301(b), the legislature gave additional
force to the mandate requiring that patient records be kept confi-
dential. Subsection (b) states in full that "[a]ny provider of medical
care who has custody of medical records may not reveal specific
75. Greenberg, The Dangerous Patient and Psychiatric Liability, 2 TREATMENT TRENDS 2
(1987).
76. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
77. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 2.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 3.
80. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (Supp. 1987).
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medical information contained in those records to any person un-
less authorized by the individual on which the record is kept.",81
It seems clear that should the hypothetical doctor be practicing
in Maryland, and should the physician decide that the danger
presented by Bob to his sexual partners is so great as to warrant a
breach of confidentiality, 82 the State would make any such breach
actionable. Maryland has provided for more strict adherence to the
doctrine of confidentiality than has the medical profession itself.
While the profession would allow disclosure if the doctor "is re-
quired to do so by law" or if "it becomes necessary in order to pro-
tect the welfare of the individual or the community," the Maryland
statute provides no such exception. The doctor "may not reveal
specific medical information . . . to any person unless authorized by
the individual on whom the report is kept."8' Regardless of a third
person's relationship to the patient-whether it be that of spouse,
other immediate family, or casual acquaintance-a doctor is prohib-
ited from revealing medical information concerning the patient to
the third person. Consequently, as long as Bob insists on confiden-
tiality, the doctor is statutorily precluded from discussing Bob's con-
dition with his ex-wife, fiancee, or any other potential sexual
partner.
The penalty for any disclosure is potentially quite high. Subsec-
tion (d) of the statute delineates the penalty for any breach of confi-
dentiality which falls within the provision. It specifies that "[a]
provider of medical care who knowingly violates any provision of
this section shall be liable to the plaintiff for any damages recover-
able in law or equity, including reasonable attorney's fees." 84 In or-
der to be subject to penalty, the doctor must knowingly violate the
statute. This may or may not be a difficult requirement to meet as
any decision regarding liability will necessarily turn on the definition
of "knowingly." Is "knowingly" synonymous with "intentionally"
or does it simply refer to knowledge of the law? Citizens, including
doctors, are presumed to know the law. Certainly, it would be no
81. Id. at (b).
82. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
83. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301(b) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). In
stark contrast to Maryland's confidentiality statute, the American Medical Association
recently "urged physicians to warn the sexual partners of patients found to carry the
AIDS virus if there was no other way to alert them to the danger." The association's
420-member House of Delegates concluded that "the physician has a responsibility to
inform the spouse or known partners. This is more than an option. This is a profes-
sional responsibility." The Sun (Baltimore),July I, 1988, at Al, col. I.
84. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301(d) (Supp. 1987).
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defense for a doctor to say that he or she was not aware of the stat-
ute's existence.
Additionally, it is clear that the thrust of the statute is against
disclosure. Nondisclosure is the rule, not the exception; unless the
doctor's situation falls within a specific exception provided for in
subsection (c) of the statute, the physician must not disclose the in-
formation. Therefore, the only real inquiry involves whether the
doctor's particular circumstances are sufficient to place him or her
within a subsection (c) exception."s
There are a host of exceptions to the apparent blanket prohibi-
tion against disclosure."6 Of the eleven listed in subsection (c),
none specifically addresses the problem posed in the earlier hypo-
thetical situation. It is at least arguable, however, that section
4-301(c)(3) could be interpreted to include telling Bob's contacts if
he refuses to do so. The exception, an extremely broad one, ex-
cludes "[p]roviding information required to conduct the proper ac-
tivities of the health care provider." '  "Proper activities"
conceivably could include any number of things. Given the earlier
discussion of doctors' duty to society as a whole,88 warning Bob's
sexual contacts may be "proper activities of the health care pro-
vider." Perhaps in such a situation, the doctor's duty to society su-
persedes the duty to Bob. If this is indeed the case, the doctor will
not be liable for violation of section 4-301. The inquiry again will
focus on the limited breach of confidentiality exception espoused by
the medical community.8 9
Even if a situation does not fall clearly within one of the enu-
merated exceptions, the statute leaves room for a clever doctor (or
the doctor's attorney) to maneuver a bit. Subsection (b) says that a
health care provider "who has custody of medical records may not
reveal specific medical information contained in those records."go If
read literally, the statute says that the health care provider who has
custody of the records may not reveal specific information contained in
85. There is, of course, also the question regarding the amount of the plaintiff's
damages.
86. MD. HEL.TH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301(c) (Supp. 1987). For the full text of these
exceptions, see supra note 3.
87. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301(c)(3) (Supp. 1987).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
89. It also is noteworthy that a second exception contained in § 4-301(c)(4) estab-
lishes exclusion for "[p]roviding information to a government agency performing its
lawful duties as authorized by an act of the Maryland General Assembly or the United
States Congress." MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (c)(4) (Supp. 1987). In situa-
tions in which disclosure is required by law, the statute obviously is not violated.
90. Id. § 4-301 (b).
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the records. Certain questions immediately come to mind: must the
doctor actually have custody of the records? In addition, what is
meant by specific? Could the hypothetical doctor, without mention-
ing AIDS, simply tell Bob's contacts that Bob is ill? Could the doc-
tor go so far as to say that Bob is ill and then recommend "safe
sex"? And what about information not contained in the records?
Will failure to adequately document effectively release the doctor
from any confidentiality requirement? Until these questions are an-
swered, the full reach and intent of the statute will remain unclear.
As previously mentioned, should it be decided that section 4-301"
does not prohibit disclosure in situations similar to the proposed
hypothetical, the statute would not be violated and the inquiry again
could focus on the traditional confidentiality doctrine.9 2
IV. MARYLAND TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Although it did not deal specifically with the problem of doctor-
patient confidentiality and duty to warn, the Governor's Task Force
on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome9 3 addressed a number
of issues pertaining to AIDS. The Task Force's subsequent recom-
mendations to the Governor are at least tangentially related to the
issue at hand and will be discussed briefly here.
The Task Force does not recommend any further legislation in
this area. Rather, it insists that emphasis should be placed on edu-
cation.94 Since there is presently no cure for the disease, the Task
Force advocates focusing on prevention. It believes that "education
is key to preventing the spread of AIDS and HIV infection before it
reaches an even greater number of Marylanders. No matter who is
the audience, the general message remains the same."95 The Task
Force urges individuals to adopt behaviors which will help prevent
transmitting the disease, to know their sexual partners (their back-
ground, history, and possible risk of HIV infection), and to learn the
facts about the disease. 6 Education is indeed important and neces-
sary, but it might not be enough. Some individuals, presumably not
unlike Bob's ex-wife or fiancee, are not aware of their at-risk status.
91. Id. § 4-301.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
93. "In December 1985, Governor Harry Hughes appointed a Task Force composed
of twenty-two Maryland citizens .... The Task Force was asked to advise the Executive
Branch and help develop statewide policies" concerning AIDS. GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE, supra note 5, at v (preface).
94. Id. at 44.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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A woman may know the facts about AIDS, but have no idea that her
husband of twenty-seven years is bisexual. She, therefore, will not
make a concerted effort to protect herself from contracting the
disease.
In addition, the Task Force strongly advises against any legisla-
tion regarding mandatory reporting or contact tracing.9 7 While it
believes that confirmed cases of AIDS should continue to be re-
ported, the Task Force is adamantly opposed to adopting legislation
or amending regulations to include reporting of HIV-positive indi-
viduals.9 As an initial matter, the Task Force believes that the Sec-
retary of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene "can
require the reporting by physicians .... under the Annotated Code
of Maryland, Health General Articles (H.G.) § 18-201 .... of indi-
viduals who have certain infectious or contagious diseases." 99 Sec-
tion 18-201 states in relevant part that "[a] physician with reason to
suspect that a patient under the physician's care has an infectious or
contagious disease that endangers public health shall submit immedi-
ately a report to the health officer for the county where the physician
cares for that patient."'
0 0
A list of the reportable infectious or contagious diseases is con-
tained in the Code of Maryland Regulations. 0 1 At this time, only
confirmed cases of AIDS are reportable.'0 2 It is the position of the
Task Force that positive HIV test results should not be reported at
all, but that in the event an amendment regarding reporting of HIV-
positive individuals is warranted, the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene has ample authority to effectuate the
change.'0 3 The Task Force is concerned that mandatory reporting
of HIV infection would discourage individuals from being tested. '04
Although a valid concern, the question again arises as to what makes
this disease different from those presently reportable.' 0 5 One an-
swer is that the test presently being administered is technically inac-
curate. It does not confirm the presence of a disease; rather, it
merely detects the presence of antibodies indicating exposure to the
infection. In addition, .the test produces. a number of false
97. Id. at 21.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-201 (1987) (emphasis added).
101. MD. REGS. CODE tit. X, § 10.06.01.02 (1983).
102. Id. § 10.06.01.02A.(1)(b)(i).
103. GOVERNOR's TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 24.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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positives. 0 6
Originally, these arguments against mandatory reporting may
have been meritorious. It was thought that only ten to forty percent
of seropositive individuals ultimately would develop AIDS.' 0 On
balance, it seemed fundamentally unfair to subject an individual to
the fear, panic, and social stigma associated with AIDS when the
chances of developing the disease were relatively small. Mandatory
reporting would have stigmatized a number of perfectly healthy in-
dividuals who posed no threat to society.
These same arguments are less forceful today. Although an
ELISA test does produce twenty to thirty percent false positives, two
ELISAs and a confirmatory Western Blot reduce the chance of error
to 0.5 percent.'0 8 ' As testing improves, the fear of subjecting per-
fectly healthy individuals to alienation and discrimination is less
real. The problems of substantial over-inclusivity are dramatically
reduced. Furthermore, medical experts now fear that the percent-
age of individuals who eventually progress from HIV positive to
AIDS is close to 100 percent.' 9 It also is important to remember
that seropositive individuals are presumed capable of transmitting
the disease, even if they show no signs of illness themselves.' 10
The real question is whether mandatory reporting of HIV-posi-
tive results will seriously discourage,,testing. Such an effect could
prove disastrous to the individual, his or her contacts, and society as
well. It is important to recognize that third p*ties are no more at
risk if individuals are tested and results are not reported than they
are if no test is ever administered. It is critical that individuals be
106. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The appropriate test is really one of
balancing interests, costs, and benefits. Although a seropositive individual definitely
poses a potential threat to the community, the severity of that threat changes with each
new set of circumstances. Since the virus is not casually transmitted, responsible indi-
viduals conceivably can monitor and modify their own behavior so as to virtually elimi-
nate any danger to others. Perhaps the individual will no longer engage in sexual
activities, or will engage in sex only with a condom. Others, however, will not act
responsibly. See, e.g., The Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1987, at Al, col. I. They will
refuse to accept the test results, will deny the seriousness of their condition, and will
continue to conduct their lives as they have in the past, taking no special precautions.
There are still others who, angered by the unfairness of their predicament, will deliber-
ately be promiscuous for the sole purpose of infecting others. It is not the seropositive
individuals who pose the real threat to society, but rather individuals who test positive
yet refuse to alter their behavior. Unfortunately, there is no way to distinguish between
the two until it is too late.
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tested. Once the results are known, these individuals may choose to
modify their own behavior. They may, on their own initiative, tell
sexual partners of their condition. If not, there is still a chance that
further counseling will convince them to do so. If, however, fear of
mandatory reporting prevents individuals from getting tested in the
first place, nothing can be done to prevent them from engaging in
high-risk behavior. Society as a whole benefits by encouraging test-
ing and thereby reducing high-risk behavior. In addition, testing
provides essential statistics that help researchers in their attempt to
learn more about the disease and eventually find a cure.
The strength of the Task Force's decision to oppose mandatory
reporting rests on its conclusion that individuals otherwise would
never consent to testing. To the extent that this premise is correct,
the decision is laudable. To the extent that the Task Force decision
stems from.concern regarding the accuracy of the test and the per-
centage of individuals who progress from HIV-positive status to
AIDS, the reasoning is flawed. These factors simply do not out-
weigh the interests of innocent third parties and society in general.
This same belief that individuals will be deterred from seeking
testing and proper medical care has prompted the Task Force to
recommend "that active, contact tracing for AIDS and HIV infection
be handled differently than it is for other sexually transmitted dis-
eases."1I " There are a number of reasons for this determination.
As an initial matter', the Task Force points out that "[a]ctive routine
contact tracing for AIDS or HIV infection would be difficult to pur-
sue effectively without strong legal safeguards against discrimina-
tion."'' 2 In addition, since there is as yet no cure available, the
"negative psychological and social impact of being told one is a pos-
sible contact of an HIV-infected person may be as damaging as the
risk of acquiring the disease itself.""'  The Task Force also men-
tions that "[elven if a third party is notified or seeks medical care,
appropriate counseling and education are the primary services that
can be offered to the contact."' 4 The Task Force seems to be say-
ing that since these are the only services available and since they can
be readily obtained by any third party, contact tracing is unneces-
sary. This begs the question. Those who are completely unaware of
their at-risk status will not seek help. When third-party contacts are
I 11. GOVERNoR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 24. Health officials do engage in con-
tact tracing when a venereal disease is involved. See supra note 53.
112. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE. supra note 5, at 24.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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notified of their possible exposure, they are made aware of the po-
tential dangers and can adjust their lifestyles accordingly.
Contact tracing also presents a number of practical problems.
It is, by definition, voluntary. Infected individuals may choose not
to reveal the names of their contacts. Even if names are indeed re-
leased, it may be difficult to verify that the contact actually occurred
before the third party is notified of the possible exposure and any
negative consequences occur.' 15 It also would be extremely difficult
to keep these lists confidential.
It seems that, at least to a certain extent, each of the above fac-
tors applies to other sexually transmitted diseases as well. Certainly
the practical problems of confidentiality and verification of contacts
are equally applicable to other diseases. Although perhapsnot as
severe as with AIDS or HIV infection, victims of sexually transmit-
ted diseases suffer from a certain amount of social stigma. One ma-
jor difference, however, is the fact that AIDS invariably results in
death. Other sexually transmitted diseases at least can be
controlled.
The Task Force is concerned primarily with facilitating the test-
ing of at-risk individuals. Since contact tracing could seriously im-
pede this objective, the Task Force recommends that the onus be on
health care providers to "encourage HIV-infected patients to speak
directly" with their sexual partners." 6 "Given the. serious nature of
HIV infection and the availability of properly trained counselors and
providers, the Task Force believes that, in most cases, patients will
cooperate with the provider's request." ' "'? This may or may not be a
naive assumption. In any event, the Task Force has placed a heavy
burden on the medical profession and has neglected to give health
care providers adequate direction.
The Task Force advises doctors to encourage their patients to
tell their sexual contacts of the infection, but goes on to admit that
there "are instances ... when these professionals may be obligated to
notify persons known to have had significant exposures to HIV infec-
tion."' 8 If "the health care provider encourages the HIV-infected
patient to communicate to his/her sexual. . . contacts the need to be
evaluated and such cooperation is explicitly refused," the Task
Force believes that any known third parties should be notified.' '9
115. Id.
116. Id. at 21.
117. Id. at 24.
118. ld. at 21.
119. id. at 22. By "notify." the Task Force envisions a semi-anonymous warning. The
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Just such a situation is presented in the hypothetical. Bob has
refused to discuss his condition with anyone. According to the Task
Force, the doctor would not only be justified but may be obligated
to inform any known contacts. Although the doctor would not be
expected to discern the names and whereabouts of Bob's sexual
contacts, the physician no doubt would have to warn both Bob's ex-
wife and his fiancee.
The Task Force only requires that the doctor notify those sex-
ual contacts known to him or her. The doctor is under no duty to
investigate or interrogate a patient. Still, the entire procedure
seems to undermine the doctor-patient relationship. It encourages
the patient to lie. When asked if the patient's sexual contacts have
been told of the infection, it would save both doctor and patient a
lot of trouble if the patient simply says "yes." Unless the doctor has
a duty to follow up on this information, unless the doctor calls those
known sexual contacts and asks if they have really been told, the
inquiry will end when the patient says "yes." Does the doctor really
satisfy the duty to warn by asking the patient? If not, what more
must the doctor do?
The Task Force believes that in situations similar to the pro-
posed hypothetical "the duty to notify is a matter of good medical
practice and supersedes the need to maintain confidentiality.' 20 It
neglects to address, however, the impact of Maryland's disclosure
statute or the ramifications that such conduct could have for the
doctor.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Task Force did address a number of important
issues concerning AIDS, it did not provide any clear answers for a
physician facing a problem like that posed in the hypothetical. Per-
haps this is because there are no clear answers. Since so little is
known about the disease itself, it is very difficult to propose effective
legislation pertaining to it. Still, the medical profession has been
placed in an intolerable situation. Doctors are instructed to counsel
and encourage seropositive individuals to discuss their condition
with their sexual partners. If this request is refused and those at risk
patient's contacts will be informed that they have been exposed to the infection; but will
not be told the source of the exposure. This is problematic, if not ridiculous. If the
third person has been married and faithful for many years, he or she will know the
source of the exposure despite any feeble attempts at confidentiality.
120. Id. at 21.
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are known to the doctor, "good medical practice"'' obligates the
doctor to inform them. Is the doctor who does so then subject to
liability for breach of confidentiality? The traditional view of the
American Medical Association rejects this notion since disclosure is
"necessary in order to protect the welfare of the... community. "122
But section 4-301 of Maryland Health-General Code Annotated is
more strict. Unless the doctor's conduct is authorized by one of the
enumerated exceptions, disclosure of the information is prohibited.
Doctors should not be forced to make such a choice. The American
Medical Association agrees and has proposed the following
recommendations:
Specific statutes must be drafted which, while protecting to
the greatest extent possible the confidentiality of patient
information, (a) provide a method for warning unsuspect-
ing sexual partners, (b) protect physicians from liability for
failure to warn the unsuspecting third party but,
(c) establish clear standards for when a physician should
inform the public health authorities, and (d) provide clear
guidelines for public health authorities who need to trace
the unsuspecting sexual partners of the infected person. 2 3
These proposals are easy to suggest but difficult to effectuate.12 4
At the very least, the American Medical Association Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs' recommendation to enact legislation
protecting "physicians from liability for failure to warn the unsus-
121. Id.
122. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
123. See Council Report, supra note 44, at 3.
124. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommends providing a method for
warning unsuspecting sexual partners. It appears that this could be accomplished in a
number of ways. The seropositive individual could tell his or her partners, the doctor
could do so, or the burden could be placed on the Health Department. Initially, it seems
that the most practical and efficient way to warn people would be to do so through the
Health Department. If HIV-positive individuals were reported to the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, the agency could warn sexual contacts in much the same
way that it does with other communicable diseases. The Secretary has the authority to
make reporting mandatory and the mechanism for contact tracing is already in place.
This method would relieve physicians of the burden and place it with an agency already
equipped to handle it. Furthermore, tracing through the Health Department serves to
protect the doctor-patient relationship as it distances the doctor from the actual disclo-
sure to the contacts. The integrity of the profession is thereby preserved as doctors will
be able to concentrate on treatment and care instead of patient investigation.
There are a number of factors, however, which weigh heavily against mandatory
reporting of seropositive individuals. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
Perhaps most important is the fact that reporting will discourage people from being
tested. This, alone, may be sufficient to warrant abandoning the idea of mandatory
reporting.
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pecting third party"'215 should be implemented. Such legislation
would be in harmony with the disclosure prohibition of section 4-
301, 26 and would remove the physician from the situation of poten-
tial liability to suit regardless of his or her conduct. Unfortunately,
this provision alone does nothing to protect the innocent third
party. It is only if the Council's complete recommendation is
adopted that all interests involved (those of the individual, his or her
contacts, society, and the physician) will be addressed.
Currently, Maryland law provides insufficient guidance for doc-
tors forced to chose between honoring the traditional doctor-pa-
tient confidentiality and warning unsuspecting third-parties of
substantial forseeable harm. Until some definite legislation is
passed, the doctor's position is a perilous one.
JUDITH C. ENSOR
125. See Council Report, supra note 44, at 3.
126. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 4-301 (1987).
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